AceOps
- The National Professional Certified Operators Association

The Professional Certified Operator’s E-Bulletin

Volume 1, No. 2, November 1999

The following article was a difficult one for me to write.  It is not intended as a warning to anyone, but merely an attempt to document the course of an Iowa Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) investigation into data tampering, and how IDNR handles such allegations.  Only IDNR staff members are named, though the operators’ names are now a matter of public record.  Also, several operators have asked either myself, Steve Moehlmann, or others about the facts pertinent to the following case, so we are publishing this as an attempt to meet such requests.

On May 6, 1998 I was contacted by a person from Fairfield.  We discussed the Surface Water Treatment Rule, focusing on ways IDNR determines compliance with the turbidity and the chlorine residual standards.  On Thursday, August 20^th the same person asked me for a confidential personal meeting the next day.  We met the morning of Friday, August 21 in the IDNR Central Office.  This person brought an approximately 80-page file containing alleged evidence of data tampering/falsification at the Fairfield Water Works over the last three years.

After speaking with the complainant and accepting this evidence, I informed Ms. Charlotte Henderson, who functions as IDNR’s Water Supply Section data quality coordinator (I am the Surface Water Treatment Rule and State Revolving Funds coordinator).  We informed our Supervisor, Dennis Alt, and his immediate supervisor, Darrell McAllister (Chief of IDNR’s Water Quality Bureau) of the allegations.  Mr. McAllister had Mr. Alt appoint a five-person subgroup to examine in detail the evidence provided by the complainant.  This group consisted of Ms. Henderson, myself, Jamie Mootz (IDNR's Environmental Specialist for the Fairfield area), Roy Ney, (IDNR's lead water supply engineer), and Diane Moles (IDNR's quality control/quality assurance scientist).

The evidence provided consisted of copies of Monthly Operation Reports (MOR), lab notes, operator logs, and supporting spreadsheets and photographs.  The subgroup found evidence that there were at least seven months where at least one turbidity reading exceeded 0.5 NTU, and was incorrectly recorded between the log sheet and the MOR submitted to IDNR.  There were exceedances in May 1998 shown on the log-sheet, but we did not have the May 1998 MOR to compare it to. 

The subgroup found evidence on the following specific days that the turbidity standard was exceeded, and went either unreported or was deliberately mis-reported:

1.      May 5 & 6, 1998

2.      April 17 & 25, 1998

3.      August 10-16, 1997

4.      July 1-2, 1997

5.      June 1-3 & 22-23, 1997

6.      December 17, 1996

7.      August 18, 1996

8.      July 1996

9.      June 24, 1996

10. July, 1995

Two types of violations stood out to the subgroup as not conceivably being accidental.  They are:

1)      A disturbing number of turbidimeter readings were recorded on the operator log sheets as either 1.019 NTU or 1.02 NTU.  The subgroup found no readings above these numbers, though  several turbidity spike events during the times of these readings were alleged.  It was the subgroup’s conclusions that the many readings of 1.019 NTU were not coincidental.

2)      There was also a startling number of cases where turbidimeter readings as found on the operator log sheets were apparently altered downward in the following pattern: recorded readings were changed from 0.592 to 0.392, leaving the last two digits unchanged, but changing the most significant digit. It was the subgroup’s conclusions that the many instances of figures being changed in this manner could NOT be a result of normal operator error.

Following the subgroup’s conclusions, IDNR decided to immediately involve the Iowa Attorney General’s office.  They asked IDNR to conduct an on-site inspection of the Fairfield plant to study the turbidimeter in question and peruse the original records to verify that the copies we received from the complainant are accurate.  Beside myself, Roy Ney from this office, Terri Bowman from the University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory, and Paul Brandt from IDNR's Field Office #6 participated in this inspection.  The inspection confirmed that the records originally given to me were indeed the accurate and official Fairfield records, and that the turbidimeter was working as designed.

At this point, the Attorney General decided there was sufficient evidence to conduct an on-site inspection by their own office, with subsequent questioning of the operators who were alleged to be involved.  An EPA attorney accompanied the A.G. staff person on this inspection.  Sufficient evidence was found on this inspection to warrant criminal charges.  Recorder strip charts were seized as part of this investigation at this time.  The A.G.’s office asked the IDNR at that point to review and confirm the summary of our review of Fairfield’s continuous monitoring and recording turbidity strip charts (and lab logbooks); the seized material available was from 1997 and 1998.  The results of our review continued to indicate substantial falsification of records, and the case proceeded.  The two accused operators retained counsel, and eventually pled guilty to one count each of falsification of data in connection with monitoring the plant treatment process and distribution system to ascertain compliance with the requirements of the Surface Water Treatment Rule.

The final settlement included:

1)      The permanent revocation of their drinking water operator certification.

2)      An agreement on the part of the two men to never apply for such certification again.

As part of the settlement process, IDNR required Fairfield to submit a written report prepared by a registered engineer, evaluating the entire water testing program, treatment process, and distribution system.  At a minimum, the report had to address:

A.     The adequacy of the system’s turbidity monitoring and response capabilities.

B.     Identification of areas within the treatment process and distribution system that are not in compliance with the requirements of the Surface Water Treatment Rule, the anticipated requirements of the proposed Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule, and subsequent Disinfection and Disinfection By-products Rules.

C.     Identification of the best available technology for compliance with the Surface Water Treatment Rule in conjunction with the surface water source.

D.     Analysis of the system’s capacity to continue to provide adequate amounts of potable water.

E.      A time schedule for completing the corrective actions of all deficiencies identified.

 The city's consultant has submitted the report which has been approved by the Department.  It recommends discontinuation of the surface water treatment system and addition of a new well.  The overall settlement had to be presented for approval by the Department's Environmental Protection Commission.  This was approved by the EPC in July 1999.